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Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation
Jeffrey Abramsont

Several recent works of political theory have put forward a
model of democracy that gives deliberation, and popular
participation in deliberation, a central place in resolving moral
disagreements among citizens.'
Rather than shunting moral
disputes as irresolvable or leaving their solution to the courts,
theorists of democratic deliberation have argued that disputes over
fundamental moral values have a place in politics and that citizens
motivated by mutual respect toward their opponents or similar
constraints can reason publicly to attain justifiable conclusions. As
philosophers Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson put it, the "core
idea" behind deliberative democracy is simple: even "when citizens
or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to
reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions." 2 When
asked to give a practical example of such deliberation, deliberative
democracy theorists often cite the jury as an institution that
embodies the ideal of using collective reasoned discussion to attain
a common verdict.
I would like to take a closer look at exactly how the deliberative
ideal works 'in the jury context. I do not seek to determine whether
jurors actually live up to the ideals of deliberation, for I assume
that they do so only imperfectly. Rather, I will argue that even in
the jury setting we are confused about exactly what the deliberative
ideal is - and that this confusion is itself one reason deliberation
often fails to produce agreement in the jury context.
Two theories compete. One theory demands that each juror be
as impartial as possible.' This theory's emphasis on individual
impartiality as the key to reasoned deliberation greatly constrains
who can serve on juries and what jurors can know before trial or
say during deliberations.
The alternative statement of the deliberative ideal renounces
the search for individually impartial jurors and aims instead at the
t Stulberg Professor of Law and Politics, Brandeis University.

I Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal ofDemocracy (Basic
1994); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard 1996);
James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation(Yale 1991).
2 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy andDisagreement at 1.
3 United States v Parker,19 F Supp 450,458 (D NJ 1937).
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overall impartiality of deliberations achievable when a jury
represents a cross-section of the community. The more closely the
jury mirrors the community makeup, it is argued, the more
impartial its deliberations will be.4
I will suggest that the individual impartiality ideal and the
representative or pluralist ideal (as I shall call it) differ in five
important ways: (1) The impartialist asks jurors to bracket who
they are and to deliberate impersonally, whereas the pluralist
encourages jurors to speak from their personal experience; (2) the
impartialist prefers importing jurors from a distance, whereas the
pluralist seeks local jurors able to speak for the community
aggrieved by the crime; (3) the impartialist prizes indifference and
lack of juror emotion, whereas the pluralist values a rough-andtumble debate; (4) the impartialist fears pretrial publicity and
prefers jurors unfamiliar with what the media have been blaring,
whereas the pluralist is wary of "dumbing down" juries by equating
empty-mindedness with open-mindedness; and (5) the impartialist
constrains jurors to render only verdicts according to law, whereas
the pluralist is tempted to allow jurors to deliberate according to
their conscience.
In the first part of this Article, I will detail these distinctions
and attempt to put forward the best case possible for both the
impartialist and pluralist ideals. I believe, however, that
representation is indispensable for informed, democratic
deliberation on juries. And while it is easy to acknowledge this
principle in general, I question how far we can push for diversity
on juries before we must concede that deliberation is mythic and
that representation means only that jurors will represent the
opinions and preferences of their own kind. In my conclusion, I
will return to this fundamental question, asking how far we can
go in resdesigning the jury into a "body truly representative of
the community"5 before we transform a deliberative judicial body
into just another political bargaining unit.
4 People v Wheeler, 583 P2d 748, 755 (1978); Commonwealth v Soares, 387 NE2d 499,
516 (1979); Jury Selection and Service Act, Pub L No 90-274, 82 Stat 53 (1968) codified at 28
USC §§ 1861-69 (1994); Jon Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures:Our Uncertain Commitment to RepresentativePanels 18 (Ballinger 1977):

("[A] randomly selected jury will not necessarily be 'impartial' in the
strict sense of that term, because the jurors bring to the jury box prejudice and perspectives gained from their lifetimes of experience. But they
will be impartial in the sense that they will reflect the range of the community attitudes, which is the best we can do.").
5 Smith v Texas, 311 US 128, 130 (1940).
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IDEALS OFJURYDELMERATION
I. THE IMPARTIALITY IDEAL VERSUS THE PLURALIST
PARADIGM

A. Bracketing versus Representing
Those who make impartiality the crux of the deliberative ideal
prod jurors to bracket or to put aside their personal preconceptions,
perspectives, and prejudices about the case.6 Some of a juror's
initial views stem from individual life experiences, while others
flow from living life as a person of a given race or sex. But
impartiality is achieved only to the extent that jurors pull up the
anchors of their own identity, take new bearings from evidence
considered impersonally, and then guide themselves toward a
"verdict," which is Latin for "spoken truth."
Political life offers no truth against which to judge, for
example, the accuracy of election results. Assuming voting meets
no discriminatory obstacles, election results are considered
accurate merely because they tally up majority preferences.! The
impartialist, by contrast, insists on having an external standard of
truth against which to judge jury verdicts. The impartialist thus
points out that the defendant in a paternity suit either is the child's
natural father or he is not. 0. J. Simpson either killed Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman or he did not. Jurors are
sworn to seek truth in such matters and to put aside their own
interests and opinions in order to do so. Sometimes, of course, as
the political theorist Michael Walzer points out,
the truth lies beyond Uurors'] reach, and they find themselves choosing among competing approximations. Sometimes they make mistakes; sometimes individual members
are corrupt or partisan. Sometimes disagreements are too
deep and no verdict is possible; sometimes the members
merely strike a bargain. But the criticisms that we commonly make of juries serve in effect to ratify their purpose.
For what we say is that they should have done better, or
that we could have done better, not that there is nothing
to be done. In principle, at least, true speech is possible.'
How do we select jurors able to render truthful verdicts and
6
7
8

United States v Wood, 299 US 123, 145-46 (1936).
Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of PluralistDemocracy:Automony vs Control 87 (Yale 1982).
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice263-64 (Basic Books 1983).
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not just deliver opinions? The impartialist focuses on each individual juror, preferring jurors with enough virtue to bracket their
own selves and to reason impersonally from the evidence. Since
impartiality requires uncommon virtue, the impartialist has historically not sought to recruit jurors from the general population
but preferred to screen for people "esteemed in the community for
their integrity, good character, and sound judgment."9 Even today, when jury selection by law must start from a list representative of the community at large,' ° the impartialist defends lawyers'
remaining rights to eliminate any or all potential jurors suspected of bias, regardless of the ultimate effect on jury diversity."
By contrast, those who treat representation as the key to
jury deliberation reject the bracketing approach to impartiality
on both practical and normative grounds. Few if any people can
live up to an ideal that requires them to suppress the influence of
their station in life, let alone the force of their deeply held moral
commitments. 12 But even if jurors could conform to the bracketing ideal, such a norm would still be undesirable because it would
impoverish rather than enrich jury deliberations. After all, jurors
are not simply judges by another name. Their unique mission is
to expose adjudication to the experiences of ordinary people
drawn from different walks of life, not to insulate adjudication
from such perspectives. Deliberation should therefore invite and
embrace, not exclude and bracket, expressions of what one differently knows as a woman, a person of color, a taxicab driver, or a
victim of crime. Under this model, jurors seek the truth, but it is
9 Carterv Jury Commission, 396 US 320, 331 (1970). See also Charles A. Lindquist, An
Analysis ofJurorSelection Proceduresin the United States District Courts, 41 Temple L Q 32,
45 (1967) (describing the so-called "key man" system where jury commissioners asked key
men of the community to recommend "blue ribbon" persons for jury duty).
10 28 USC § 1861 (declaring it to be "the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community... "). See also Taylor v Louisiana,419 US
522, 530 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury trial requires selection from a cross section of the community).
11 Granting of hardship excuses, challenges for cause, and peremptory challenges all have
the potential to skew the representativeness of juries. The Supreme Court has specifically
upheld the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge system against arguments that the
system is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment requirement for cross-sectional jury selection. See Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474, 480 (1990); Abramson, We, The Jury at 138-39 (cited

in note 1).
12 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operationof the Jury System,
26 FRD 409, 421-22 (1960); Harvard Law Review Association, Developments: Race and the
CriminalProcess, 101 Harv L Rev 1472, 1559 (1988); Sheri Lynn Johnson, UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 Cornell L Rev 1016, 1022 (1988); People v Wheeler, 583 P2d
748, 755; Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 Hastings L J
1417, 1429-30 (1969).
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a "whole truth" best knowable when diversity prods jurors to consider all relevant information and perspectives. 3
I will put the pluralist position another way. The more closely
jurors reproduce and mirror the diversity of views in our
heterogeneous society, the more completely the jury discharges its
democratic mission of accurately representing the views of the
whole community. If the jury is balanced to accomplish this
representative task, then as a whole it will achieve a degree of
impartiality that no single juror is capable of reaching. The jury
will achieve the "overall" or "diffused" impartiality that comes from
balancing the competing biases and the diverse viewpoints rooted
in American demographics. 4
In this balanced deliberation, the experiences of some jurors
will supplement the experiences of others, permitting the whole
jury to take into account all relevant information and all relevant
perspectives. Moreover, when juries are representative, the group
bias of some jurors checks the group bias of others, silencing the
most blatant expressions of prejudice and encouraging a consensusThe very diversity of jury
driven mode of conversation.
membership helps bring out arguments capable of moving a
divergent group of people toward a mutually acceptable verdict.
Consider, for instance, the 1990 conviction of Han Tak Lee, a
Korean-born defendant, for murdering his daughter by arson. No
Asian American served on the jury, and several jurors indicated
that they were swayed by the prosecutor's emphasis on Lee's lack of
emotion when firefighters led his grieving wife and him to the
charred barn where their daughter's body was found. Following
the guilty verdict, Asian American groups rallied in support of Lee,
pointing out that his "behavior during and after the fire was
inexplicable to most Americans and appeared to convey his guilt but it was perfectly in tune with Korean custom." 5
Whatever the truth may have been about Han Tak Lee, jurors
would have been better equipped to find it had they known more
about Korean grief customs. Take another case where pluralists
see a connection between diversity and deliberation. In 1984,
13 Note, 20 Hastings L J at 1429 (cited in note 12); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S Cal L Rev 235-45 (1968); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 Mich L Rev 1611, 1706 (1985).
14 Wheeler, 583 P2d at 755 ("overall impartiality"); Commonwealth v Soares, 377 Mass
461, 480 ("diffused impartiality") (quoting Thiel v Southern Pacific Co, 328 US 217,227 (1946)
(Frankfurter dissenting)).
15 Jennifer Lin, Was Jury Confused by Culture - or Did He Kill His Daughter?, Phila
Inquirer Al (April 28, 1992).

130

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:

Bernhard Goetz shot four African American youths on a New York
City subway after they approached him asking for five dollars.
Goetz claimed that he shot in self-defense, believing that the
panhandling was but a prelude to a mugging.
Goetz's self-defense claim required jurors to make two related
judgments.'6 The first was a quasi-factual judgment about whether
Goetz "actually" believed an attack was imminent. On this
question, pluralists concede that there were better or worse
answers for jurors to give when they assessed the credibility of
witnesses and decided whom to believe - Goetz who told police
that he really was in fear for his life, or those who said Goetz was a
racist waiting for a chance to shoot at blacks (the jury concluded
Goetz was telling the truth about his state of mind). Things would
be easier, of course, if a truth serum or reliable lie detector test
could impersonally demonstrate the truth in such matters. Failing
such evidence, we rely on jurors to arrive at the truth as best they
can.
Once the jury decided that Goetz honestly believed he was
about to be attacked, the jurors had to make a second judgment,
this time moral and legal, about whether they considered his fears
and subsequent acts to be those of a "reasonable person" in Goetz's
circumstances. For the pluralist, at this point an objective truth to
guide the jury no longer exists. Certainly there is no scientific
experiment that could demonstrate how a fictional construct such
as the "reasonable person" would have reacted in Goetz's situation.
Nor is there any impersonal method of legal reasoning we could
model for jurors that would generate definite answers about what
counts as reasonable behavior. It is true that New York law directs
jurors to consider such issues as whether Goetz could have safely
retreated and whether he used more force than was necessary to
repel the attack. 7 But even the most faithful application of these
norms to the Goetz case does not foreclose the debate about
whether Goetz should be judged "not guilty" or "guilty."
For the pluralist, then, the best and most accurate verdict the
Goetz jury could have given was a democratic answer: a verdict
capable of achieving consensus on a jury fairly recruited across the
racial and other divides that influence people's perceptions of the
matter. This is so first because only a representative jury has the
credentials to render a legitimate verdict acceptable to the entire
16 For the facts of the Goetz case upon which I base this analysis, see generally George P.
Fletcher, A Crimeof Self-Defense: BernhardGoetz and the Law on Trial (Chicago 1988).
17 Id at 19, citing NY Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney 1987).
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community. But the concept of legitimacy is of limited help here,
for it establishes only that jury diversity inspires confidence in
outsiders looking in.18
What about the jurors themselves? How does diversity support
their deliberative tasks? In the Goetz trial, a racially diverse jury
might be best able to confront the subtle ways in which race
influences our fears. Imagine a jury room echoing with the
arguments of both those mugged on subways and black kids tired of
getting suspicious looks every time they ride the cars. Imagine
jurors who themselves carry guns for protection arguing the issues
with those who feel more threatened by armed vigilantes in the
subway than by African American youths. That would be a jury
room with loud and angry exchanges. It certainly would not be a
jury ready to decide the issue in a flash and it might even be a jury
unable to agree on a verdict in the end. But if the jury could reach
a verdict, it would be because power ultimately flowed to those
arguments capable of moving minds across the usual fault lines.
This is the ideal of representative deliberation, where conversation
informed by diversity allows the behavior of the so-called
reasonable person to be studied from competing angles and
different perspectives until the jury achieves the impartiality that
the impartialists wrongly search for in isolated individuals. 9
Impartialists remain skeptical about all of this. They ask why
anyone should believe a victim of a subway mugging is capable of
serving impartially on the Goetz jury, any more than a cardcarrying member of the National Rifle Association or the mother of
an African American teenager assaulted by skinheads. It is all
very well to start jury selection with a pool of persons
representative of the community. But unless we whittle that pool
down by throwing out those whose minds cannot be changed by
deliberation, we make a fetish of diversity for diversity's sake, in
ways that will produce hung juries at best, and openly political
compromises among partisan jurors at worst. The paramount need
to eliminate biased jurors, says the impartialist, trumps even the
importance of retaining racial balance on a jury. Of course, when
we compose a list of persons eligible for jury duty in general, race is
18 For a defense of representative juries that puts primary emphasis on the jury's legiti-

mation function, see Hon. Irving Kaufman, Foreword-- Jury Selection in the Fifth Cicuit, 20
Mercer L Rev 347, 347 (1969) ("appearance ofjstie ... is as important as the actuality of

justice").
19 'Without the broad range of social experiences that a group of diverse individuals can
provide, juries are often ill-equipped to evaluate the facts presented." Harvard Law Review
Association, 101 Harv L Rev at 1559 (cited in note 12).
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irrelevant. But in any particular trial, there might be legitimate,
case-specific reasons for believing that race will influence the way
jurors respond to the evidence. In such a situation, each and every
juror must be examined to see if he or she can put racial loyalties
aside. Any loss of representativeness on the jury is justified by the
gain in impartiality.
Let me now close this debate between bracketers and
representers by illustrating the competing ways each side responds
to the age-old practice of peremptory challenges. Suppose that a
Roman Catholic priest is on trial for trespassing at a Boston
abortion clinic during a right to life protest.20 The priest appears
before the jury pool in his habit, making prosecutors wary about
the ability of Catholics in the pool to put aside religious affiliations
and convict a priest if the evidence so warrants. The prosecutors
use their peremptory challenges - challenges trial adversaries
historically have exercised without offering any public explanation
- to strike the only three jurors with Irish-sounding surnames.
Unable to ask jurors directly about their religion, the prosecutors
apparently reason that persons with Irish-sounding names in the
Boston area are likely to be Catholic and that Catholics will find it
difficult to convict a priest no matter what the evidence.
Assume there is no reason to believe these prosecutors are
motivated by anti-Catholic prejudice; in another case, they may
cast their suspicions on the partiality of Protestants. All they are
doing is what prosecutors have done for centuries, that is, making
educated guesses about who may harbor hidden prejudices against
their side.21 Sometimes, these hunches are based on matters
deemed suspicious about a particular juror - his Malcolm X hat
makes him anti-authoritarian and therefore pro-defendant, her
stern manner and refusal to smile make her a rigid personality
favorable to the prosecution.
Other times, the only feature
suspicious about a juror is that he or she is a member of a group
whose members are generally suspected of having attitudes
favorable to the other side. When peremptory challenges are based
on group stereotypes, then lawyers eliminate not just this or that
20 Commonwealth v Carleton, 629 NE2d 321 (1994); Patricia Nealon, Conviction OverturnedofPriest Who Blocked Boston Abortion Clinic, Boston Globe 19 (March 1, 1994).

21 For general background on the purposes behind the peremptory challenge, see
Abramson, We, The Jury at 131-39 (cited in note 1); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challengesand the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex L Rev 1041, 1086-92 (1995); Barbara D.

Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92
Colum L Rev 725, 770-73 (1992); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir dire: Preserving"ItsWonderful
Power," 27 Stan L Rev 545, 554-56 (1975).
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Irish person but all the Irish. The damage to jury diversity can be
great. Even so, impartialists defend peremptory challenges as one
way to permit litigants to make educated guesses about biases that
cannot quite be proved but that nevertheless exist.
But do we empanel an impartial jury when Irish Catholics are
systematically removed from a jury trying a Roman Catholic priest?
The pluralist warns, correctly I believe, that we contradict
ourselves by suddenly switching grounds and assuming that the
remaining persons in the jury pool do not bear their own competing
group biases, for instance as Boston-area Protestants historically
segregated from surrounding Catholic communities. And if we are
counting on the priest's defense lawyers to answer tit for tat, by
using their peremptories to strike presumed Protestants from the
jury pool, then we have to understand that the side targeting a
minority religion or race or ethnic group for removal from the jury
always has an advantage over the side furtively seeking to purge
members of the majority. The prosecution may succeed in
eliminating all Irish surnames from the jury room, but the defense
could never eliminate all non-Irish.
At this point, the pluralist is clearly asserting that the
traditions surrounding peremptory challenge should cede to
maintaining some degree of religious balance on the priest's jury
and, to generalize the point, some degree of demographic balance
on all juries. But even pluralists disagree about what justifies
protecting a jury's diversity from the onslaughts of the peremptory
challenge. Some rather strict pluralists turn out to be quite
skeptical about whether deliberation can truly change jurors'
minds. People vote their demographics on juries every bit as much
as they do in other voting contexts, so the best we can do is to
represent groups fairly on the jury according to their share of the
local population.22 In other words, the strict pluralist stands
prepared to transform the jury into just another political
bargaining unit, where representatives of different interests assert
their preferences when they can, compromise with others if they
must, or hang the jury when all else fails.
This is not the defense of representative juries I have been
sketching in this paper. The more moderate view, one that I find
persuasive, concludes as follows. Because demographics matter as
to where jurors start, jury selection should randomly draw people
from a representative cross-section of the population as the best
way to draw into the jury room diversity of information and values.
22

See Van Dyke, Jury Selection Proceduresat 18 (cited in note 4).
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But deliberation among diverse people may also awaken all jurors
to the blinders of their own demographics, exposing each juror to
community diversity more fully in the jury room than almost
anywhere else. That experience, one hopes, is awakening and
liberating.
So awakened, jurors ideally will not serve as
representatives of the political sort, as if they owed allegiance to the
mere preferences popular in their section of town. Certainly jurors
should insist that the views of "their sort of people" be heard and
afforded equal consideration with the views of any other group.
Merely articulating this desire is an important democratic moment
in jury deliberations, a moment where the quotidian hierarchies of
power and respect give way to true equality. But if and when this
insurgence occurs, jurors should represent their differences only as
a way to enrich the capacity of an egalitarian, collective jury to
reason beyond its differences toward a mutually acceptable,
unanimous verdict.23
B. Distance versus Proximity
A second debate over the ideal of jury deliberation centers on
geography. In criminal cases, impartialists prefer strangers to
neighbors on the jury. Distance from events, and not proximity, is
said to best insulate jury deliberations from community passions
and prejudices. Impartialists defer when necessary to historical
traditions and constitutional provisions requiring jury trials to be
held in the community aggrieved by the crime. But they consider
these local norms to be vestiges from a bygone era and would freely
grant changes of venue to protect a defendant's right to trial before
24
an impartial jury.
The Oklahoma City bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols are two recent examples where trial venues were
moved a considerable distance to secure impartial juries. The
presiding federal judge concluded that no impartial jury could be
found anywhere in Oklahoma, so great was the outrage
Oklahomans shared about an attack on their soil against fellow
citizens. Transferring the trial to Denver, it was thought, would
curtail the passions with which jurors heard the evidence.25
A more controversial venue change occurred in 1991, when the
23 For a similar statement of this way of defending the connection between representation
and deliberation, see Harvard Law Review Assn, 101 Harv L Rev at 1559 (cited in note 12).
24 For a general view of the history of the debate over holding trials locally, see Abramson, We, The Jury at 17-55 (cited in note 1).
25 United States v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1467, 1474 (W D Okla 1996).
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trial of four white Los Angeles police officers accused of beating
black motorist Rodney King was transferred from Los Angeles to
neighboring Simi Valley in Ventura County. Jurors in both
counties were probably equally exposed through television to the
infamous videotape of the officers apparently beating King. But
Ventura County jurors were thought preferable, insofar as they
could deliberate about the King case in and of itself, without
turning it into a virtual political referendum on racism in the Los
Angeles Police Department.2 6
Consider a final case about changing venue. One forgets now
that a Dallas jury once convicted Jack Ruby of killing Lee Harvey
Oswald after Oswald was arrested for assassinating John F.
Kennedy. The reason we forget is that the Texas Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, ruling that Ruby's motion for a change of
venue out of the Dallas area should have been granted. Ruby then
saved the courts from finding a fair place to hold his trial by dying
in prison. Suppose Ruby had not died - where would the Texas
courts have transferred the trial in an effort to find an impartial
jury? Were they counting on finding some place in Texas, some
place anywhere in the United States where potential jurors had not
seen Ruby shoot Oswald on television? I do not believe the courts
were that naive. Holding trial in Dallas was said to be uniquely
prejudicial because Dallas jurors would be politically motivated to
27
restore pride in the Dallas name by convicting Ruby.
From Dallas to Oklahoma City, then, changes of venue have
become an acceptable way to cure the sometimes unavoidable
tensions between impartial and local justice. Pluralists do not deny
that such tensions exist, but they prefer to resolve them in ways
that keep trials at home. Although judges cannot stop papers from
printing what they know, they can stop lawyers from talking to the
media prior to trial if their speech produces "a substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" in the trial.2 8 A trial can also be
delayed to permit passions to cool, as long as the defendant waives
his right to a speedy trial. 29 And juries can be sequestered from the
trial's outset, effectively isolating them from the community and
26 Powell v SuperiorCourt, 232 Cal App 3d 785,802 (1991). See also Excerpts:L.A Hearing on Venue ofPolice Trial, Nati L J 35 (June 1, 1992).
27 Rubenstein v State, 407 SW2d 793, 796 (Tex Crim App 1966) (McDonald concurring).
2 Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1063 (1991). For a general summary of
judicial power to control lawyer speech, see Hon. Nancy Gertner and Judith H. Mimer, The
Law ofJuries 10:8-12 (Glasser 1997).
2 See Nebraska PressAssn v Stuart, 427 US 539, 568 (1976). But see United States v
Moreno Morales, 815 F2d 725, 739 (1st Cir 1987) (noting that court as well as defendant

has right to speedy trial).
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from the media.3 °
For the pluralist school, venue changes are a remedy of last
resort because local knowledge in the jury room has positive as well
as negative effects. If we go back in jury history, a major
justification for assigning fact finding to jurors was that jurors, as
members of the local community, would hear the evidence in
context. Jurors, it was thought, would know the condition of the
street where the accident occurred, know how flagrantly the
children disobeyed "no trespassing" signs to swim in the quarry,
and know the reputations of the defendant or the witnesses.
During debates to ratify the Constitution, Patrick Henry defended
local knowledge along these lines when he attacked the
Philadelphia framers for failing to protect the so-called jury of the
"vicinage" - a jury drawn from the community where the crime
occurred. "What is meant by [the defendant's] peers?" he asked,
answering that they were "[t]hose who reside near him, his
neighbors, and who are well acquainted with his character and
situation in life."'
History has not been kind to Henry's defense of the way local
knowledge increases the accuracy of jury fact-finding. Indeed, one
of the great triumphs of the impartiality ideal is to stand history on
its head. In the name of impartiality, we now disqualify jurors for
having precisely the kind of personal acquaintance with parties or
witnesses that once qualified them for jury duty. The most
accurate fact-finder is now said to be the person who comes to court
entirely ignorant of the events and people on trial.32
Can the pluralist still find any part of the "local knowledge"
model to defend? Pluralists argue that the deepest justification for
holding trials locally is that only jurors from the community
affected by the crime are in a position to render a verdict that
democratically reflects that community's legal and moral judgment
about what the facts show. Facts are facts and perhaps can be
found as accurately by strangers as by neighbors. But distant
strangers necessarily pass judgment on what happened in ways
that reflect the prevailing standards in their community, rather
than the standards of the affected community.33
30 United States v Acuff, 410 F2d 463,467 (6th Cir 1969).

31 Jonathan Elliot, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
FederalConstitution579 (Taylor & Maury 1854).
32 UnitedStates v Parker,19 F Supp 450,458 (D NJ 1937).
33 On the loss of community participation when trials are moved to a new venue, see
generally Note, Out ofthe FryingPan or Into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue After Rodney
King, 106 Harv L Rev 705, 708-11 (1993).
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The obstacles to moral evaluation posed by distance and space
cannot be resolved by saying that since "the law is the law," any
rational jury should render the same verdict. Suppose the
defendant in an arson trial admits to burning down the "crack den"
at the end of the block but offers the perfectly proper legal defense
of "necessity." The defendant establishes that the police ignored
repeated neighborhood complaints about drug dealing from the
house and did not act even after two children were shot by stray
bullets during a drive-by shooting incident near the house. His
defense is that he turned to arson only as a last resort justified by
the necessity to save lives. If the trial is moved from that
neighborhood to a secure suburban venue and jurors there reject
the necessity defense and convict, can anyone really say this
judgment accurately reflects, speaks for, substitutes for, the local
community's judgment of the defendant's moral and legal
culpability? Even if there is a right answer about whether the'
defendant burned down the house, there is no right answer about
whether the laws of arson were meant to be enforced against him.
Indeed, some obviously guilty defendants who could ask for a
change of venue do not do so, precisely because they want to be
judged by people who know them best. Take the case of Susan
Smith, the South Carolina mother who drowned her two young
children by driving her car into a local pond. Smith elected to keep
her trial at home, knowing that it was inevitable that a jury
anywhere would convict her of murder and that the only issue was
whether she would be sentenced to death.34 A venue change would
put that decision in the hands of strangers who knew her only from
media reports. Closer to home, jurors would be more likely to know
someone who knew Smith or her family, to have some background
knowledge of her life before the murders, to see her in short as a
long time resident of their community, not just forever a monster.
Smith's gamble to keep the trial local apparently paid off when the
jury sentenced her to life.
Today, a new debate is brewing over trial geography and the
deliberative ideal. If difficulties in empaneling a jury locally
necessitate a change of venue, why not at least transfer trial to a
site where the jury pool is demographically similar to that of the
original venue?
Some states have considered demographic
34 Rick Bragg, Keeping Mother's Trial in Hometown Could be Crucial, NY Times A18
(July 13, 1995); Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict Brings Relief to Town, NY Times A16 (July
30, 1995).
35For a review of current law on changes of venue, and of new proposals to require demographic matching, see Gertner and Mizner, The Law of Juriesat 5:3-35 (cited in note 28).
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matching as a prudent way to increase the chance that the new
jury pool will include people with the same range and mix of
attitudes present in the original pool. In this way, the core
democratic values associated with our tradition of local juries could
be preserved despite a change in venue.
Proposals requiring judges to search for a demographic match
between old and new trial sites came to the fore in response to the
Rodney King case, a notorious instance where the venue changed
from diverse Los Angeles County to predominantly white Ventura
County.36 Not surprisingly, a jury without a single African
American (ten whites, one Asian American, one Hispanic
American) was then empaneled to judge "impartially" whether four
white Los Angeles police officers used excessive force to subdue a
black motorist. That jury's decision to acquit the officers of
virtually all charges (they did hang as to one) was widely rejected
as illegitimate. It provoked rioting in parts of Los Angeles and
eventually led to a second federal trial of the officers for violating
King's civil rights, a trial before a multiracial
jury in Los Angeles
37
charges.
most
of
officers
the
convicted
that
In what respect was the Ventura verdict "wrong"? Here it is
useful to use a crude fact/value distinction to analyze the jury's
task, even while acknowledging that questions about police
brutality combine factual observation and value judgments.
However, let us artificially limit the fact-finding mission of the King
jury to deciding what raw physical movements took place by whom,
against whom, and for how long when the officers confronted King.
One would assume that changing the venue of jury trial from Los
Angeles to Ventura should have had no substantial effect on
resolving the facts at this vulgar, bare-bones level.3
But if Venturans and Angelenos function similarly as factfinders, there is still every reason to believe that they differ in how
they evaluate even those facts upon which they agree.39 One can
36

See id at 5: 33-35, for bills introduced in the California, Florida, New Jersey and New

York legislatures requiring demographic matching.
37 See sources cited in Abramson, We, the Jury at 19-20 (cited in note 1).
38 During trial, the defense concentrated on breaking down the videotape frame by frame,

trying to get the jurors to "see" that King continued to move throughout the entire sequence of
events. Richard Lacayo, Anatomy of an Acquittal, Time 30 (May 11, 1992). But even Los

Angeles jurors would have "seen" img's movements. As I argue in the text, the difference
came in how people evaluated King's physical movements, whether they rose to the level of a
threat justifying the officers' continued use of force.
39 David Margolick, As Venues are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race
Should Play, NY Times 7 (May 23, 1992) (quoting a defense lawyer for one officer saying the
case would have been lost without a change of venue).
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imagine, of course, a videotape of a police beating so relentless that
it leaves no room for reasonable jurors to doubt the force was
excessive. But the sequence of events caught on the King videotape
was open to some interpretation on the crucial issue of whether
King's continued movements justified the amount of force used to
secure his arrest.40
The mostly white Ventura jury apparently evaluated what
they saw on the videotape in light of attitudes tending to trust the
police but be afraid of African American suspects. The jurors' own
life experiences apparently made it difficult for them to imagine
being in King's shoes but easy to empathize with whites
confronting an African American man whose physical movements
the Ventura County jurors evaluated as "threatening" or
"menacing."
A Los Angeles jury would either have included a sizeable
number of African Americans or at least citizens aware of the high
level of tension between police and minorities in that city. Such a
jury would have judged what they saw on the videotape through a
moral lens crafted to bring into sharper focus the legitimate fears of
a black man confronted by four police officers, and the significance
of the eighty-one blows delivered, the use of billyclubs, and the fourto-one ratio of strength between police and suspect.
In short, what we have are two demographically different
communities that viewed the same videotape through remarkably
different attitudes about police behavior toward African Americans
and vice versa. For the pluralist, this divergence means that the
change of venue failed to accomplish its purpose of trying the
officers before an impartial jury.41 At best, the transfer succeeded
only in trading one set of demographic biases for another. At worst,
moving the trial to a predominantly white county made it less
likely that a jury could reason beyond race in such a case. At least
in Los Angeles, a multiracial jury would have had the internal
capacity to mull over the confrontation as it must have appeared
both to King and to the officers. If the trial had to be moved at all,
then, the best course was to seek a county whose demography
maximized the chances of empaneling a multiracial jury.
The impartialist resists imposing color-conscious criteria on
change of venue decisions. Whether the King case stayed in Los
Angeles or moved to Ventura or some third county, the criteria for
selecting impartial jurors should remain color blindness.
No
40
41

Lacayo, Anatomy of anAcquittal, Time 30 (cited in note 38).
Susan Herman, Justice Sees Through a Glass, Darkly, Newsday 37 (May 4,1992).
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individual juror should be presumed biased simply because he or
she is white. For the same reason, no jury should be presumed
biased simply because all its members happen to be white. For the
impartialist, abandoning these basic colorblind norms when
changing venues
is akin to abandoning belief in the impartiality of
4

justice itself.

C. Indifference versus Engagement
In Massachusetts, the trial judge pronounces a potential juror
to be impartial by reciting the words 'The Court finds this juror to
be indifferent.1 3 The use of the word "indifferent" dates back to the
medieval jurist Lord Coke's definition of the ideal juror: "[He must
be] indifferent as he stands unsworne." 4
In large part, indifference simply means that a person
practices the bracketing ideal - disinterested, neutral, without
motives to favor either side at trial. But sometimes jury selection
equates indifference with a more troubling moral psychology, a
posture akin to apathy, alienation, inattention, or fundamental
nonchalance about the trial outcome. Let me give some examples:
1) Who is indifferent enough to serve as a juror on a case
trying day care center operators for sexually abusing children? 5 A
prospective juror of Asian background remarks that his culture has
no tolerance for child abuse. The judge explains that American law
has no tolerance either, but then further explores the man's obvious
"emotions" on the subject. The judge wants to know whether these
passions will override the juror's duty to presume the defendants
innocent. Even though the man accepts the presumption of
innocence, the judge dismisses him, apparently doubting that such
intensely expressed moral outrage about child sexual abuse can
ever be fully contained.46
As jury selection proceeds in the case, the judge dismisses
those who seem to lack the extra armor it will take to listen to
graphic testimony about sexual abuse and yet keep an open mind
until all the evidence is in. He dismisses anyone who acknowledges
being the victim of child sexual abuse or having a close relative so
victimized: such experiences are too powerful to be reasoned aside.
42 For a general defense of color blind norms, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (Harvard 1992).
43 Commonwealth v Barnoski, 638 NE2d 9, 15 (1994).
44 Irwin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722 (1961).
45 See Abramson, We, The Jury at 51-53 (cited in note 1).
46 Id at 53.
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The judge goes on to excuse those who have children in day
care centers because they will tend to "empathize" with the child
witnesses. He is skeptical about the potential overemotionalism of
anyone with children or grandchildren the same age as the alleged
victims. The "grandparent" issue is especially important to the
judge, given the disproportionately large number of retirees who
show up for jury duty. Excusing one grandparent after another, the
judge remarks that "we don't want to put you through this
experience" or "we know it is too difficult for you not to see your
grandchildren in these children."47
In summary, jury selection in this child sexual abuse works
relentlessly to empanel only that slice of the population for whom
child sexual abuse is not a "personal" issue or a matter of direct
concern. But why should anyone believe that lack of concern for or
dearth of emotions about child sexual abuse make for fair and
accurate deliberation inside a jury room?
2) Consider another example of how indifference can be
essential to impartial deliberation. For years, the Supreme Court
has debated whether jurors deliberating a death sentence should
hear "victim impact" statements from the relatives and friends of a
murder victim. In a 1987 case, Booth v Maryland,48 the Court ruled
against admitting such statements because they tended to distract
the jury with legally irrelevant appeals to sympathy.49 A murder
victim's survivors may ask the jury to consider the devastation the
murderer has inflicted on them. But, as the Court wondered, why
should a murderer be more culpable simply because his victim had
a spouse or children? What if the murderer did not know and had
no reason to know that his victim had a family? In such a
situation, sympathy for the survivors is irrelevant and jurors
should be indifferent as a matter of law to their sufferings, focusing
only on what the convicted man actually knew and did. 0
Booth was an extremely rigid decision, upholding an ideal of
cold-blooded reasoning for jurors deliberating the death penalty.
Surely the better view, and the one the Supreme Court itself came
around to four years later when it overruled Booth,51 is that the
suffering of a murder victim's kin is a relevant factor for jurors to
consider when deciding whether a death penalty is warranted.
47 Id at 52.
48

482 US 496 (1987).

49 Id at 507.

50 Id at 504-5.
51Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 830 (1991).
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However much we want jurors to deliberate death sentences calmly
and rationally, we can hardly expect them to be indifferent to the
words of his living victims. Murder victimizes more than the dead
person, and jurors should have to hear about the full extent of the
harm.
D. Empty Minds versus Open Minds
Jurors swear to decide cases solely upon evidence produced in
open court.52 In all cases, this oath means keeping the jury in the
dark about information that may be highly probative of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. So we do not want jurors to know
that the defendant on trial for robbery has been convicted of
robbery three times before, that he offered to plead guilty this time
around, that the stolen necklace - the only one of its kind in the
world - was found in the defendant's apartment but that the judge
will not allow it into evidence because the police raided the
apartment without probable cause or a warrant to search. Some of
this information we keep from juries because its prejudicial impact
outweighs its probative value - there is always the temptation to
think "three times a robber, always a robber," but perhaps just this
sort of thinking led police to pin the blame on the wrong man.
But what about blinding the jury to the recovery of the one-ofa-kind necklace in the defendant's apartment? Just because the
police violate the law to find incriminating evidence does not mean
that the evidence is any less incriminating. We could therefore
have a trial system that allows the jury to know the stolen necklace
was retrieved by the police but leaves it to them to consider
whether the illegality of the police search somehow makes the
recovery of the necklace suspicious. But this is not our trial system;
we impose unique and remarkable constraints on what jurors can
know or say in the jury room. This is because their task is not
simply to convict the guilty and free the innocent, but rather to
force the government to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt without violating the Constitution. These
constraints do not just mean that we prefer jurors to err on the side
of not guilty verdicts. They also open up a gulf between the
deliberations of the public following the case through the media and
the narrower deliberations expected ofjurors.
In most trials, that gulf is bridgeable because media attention
52 Pattersonv Colorado, 205 US 454, 462 (1907) ("The theory of our system is that the
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open
court... ").
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is sporadic. But problems abound in those few but widely watched
instances where the press latches onto a case, screaming the grisly
facts of a murder in the headlines, televising the shackled suspect
being arrested, and publishing every partisan leak from lawyers
that incriminates or exonerates the accused.
In such
circumstances, the ideals of impartiality and representation on a
jury fly apart."
Impartialists argue for a strict standard that would virtually
presume bias in anyone exposed to pretrial publicity. 4 When the
publicity is about matters that are inadmissible in court, such as
the defendant's prior record, the presumption of bias is at its
strongest. But impartialists doubt that impartiality can survive
"media prescreening" even of the likely admissible evidence; no one
who has already heard the evidence from the press can truly swear
the sacred oath to decide the case solely upon trial testimony. By
contrast, the more empty a person's mind is at the start of trial, the
more open that person's mind will be. As one federal judge
expressed this tabula rasa theory of impartiality:
The entire effort of our [trial] procedure is to secure... jurors who do not know... anything of either [the] character [of the parties] or events [on trial] .... [Tihe zeal displayed in this effort to empty the minds of the jurors ...
[is a sign] that the jury . . . is an impartial organ of
justice. 5
The impartialist is aware that searching for empty minds is likely
to lessen the chance that the highly educated, media-attentive
sectors of society will serve on juries. But the jury we want is
representative only of the impartial.
If realities of mass
communication mean such a jury is unrepresentative of the
community, then so be it.
Pluralists worry about "dumbing down" the jury by making
53 For a general view of the law on pretrial publicity, see Abramson, We, The Jury, at 36-

55 (cited in note 1); Gertner and Mizner, The Law of Juries at 3:27-37 (cited in note 28).
54 For cases that invoke a concept of "presumed bias," see Irwin v Dowd, 366 US 717
(1991) (adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community

that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed); State v Laaman, 331
A2d 354, 357 (1974) ("Inherent prejudice... exists when the publicity by its nature has so
tainted the trial atmosphere that it will necessarily result in lack of due process."). For the
most part, more recent Supreme Court cases have backed away from the "presumed bias"
analysis and have insisted on a showing of actual prejudice in jurors through individualized
voir dire. For a review of the cases repudiating any concept such as "presumed bias," see
Abramson, We, The Jury at 46-48 (cited in note 1).
5,5 UnitedStates v Parker,19 F Supp 450, 458 (D NJ 1937).
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empty-mindedness a necessary condition of open-mindedness.56 A
favorite story of entrusting justice only to the "fools and rascals"
comes from Mark Twain. Observing jury selection for a murder
trial where "all men capable of reading" had read press accounts of
the crime and where "all men not deaf and dumb and idiotic [had]
talked about it," Twain reported the relentless way in which the
esteemed minister, the merchant of high character, the mining
superintendent of unblemished reputation were all disqualified
merely for reading the papers, even though each said he could put
aside press accounts and attend only to the evidence. Twain
sardonically concluded that "[i]gnoramuses alone could mete out
unsullied justice."57
Like Twain, the modern pluralist contrasts the virtue of openmindedness and the vice of empty-mindedness. Of course, we want
jurors whose minds are open to the force of the trial evidence. And
yes, we should examine prospective jurors one by one in high
publicity cases to explore whether their minds are already made up
about important issues on trial. But why presume bias across the
board, why start with the elitist assumption that most citizens are
captives of the media, believing the truth of all that they read?
Pluralists make the telling point that information has the potential
to open as well as close the mind. Once inside the jury room, we
count on jurors to have the critical capacity it takes to examine the
testimony for conflicts and inconsistencies. This is a capacity that
those who follow the news are more likely to have than their
inattentive neighbors. After all, who knows better than the
news
8
retraction.?
lead
tomorrow's
is
story
junkie that today's top
Take the Iran-Contra trial of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
as an infamous example of the wholesale disqualification of the
media-attentive public. Under a grant of immunity that promised
his testimony would not be used against him in a court of law,
North testified before the Senate about his role in violating a
congressional ban on aid to Nicaraguan rebels (the Contras) by
diverting funds to the Contras from secret sales of weapons to Iran.
The testimony was carried live on television and was the leading
news story for weeks. When jury selection subsequently got under
way, the 156 members of the jury pool who reported seeing or
reading North's testimony were automatically eliminated, out of
6 This argument is made nicely in Newton N. Minow and Fred 1L Cate, Who is an ImpartialJurorin an Age ofMass Media?,40 Am U L Rev 631 (1991).
57 Mark Twain, 2 Roughing It 56-57 (Harper and Brothers 1913).
58 Minow and Cate, 40 Am U L Rev at 658 ("regular exposure to media" inculcates habits
of"evaluating the barrage of... rhetoric" useful in the jury room).
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fear that they might refer to such testimony in the jury room (in
violation of the immunity arrangement).59
After further
examination, the court excused "any prospective juror who had
rudimentary prior knowledge of North's immunized Senate
testimony."6 ° The only persons deemed sufficiently impartial to
serve as jurors were those who said "I don't like the news. I don't
like to watch it. It's depressing."6 1 Acceptable was the woman who
recalled seeing North on television but "didn't pay any more
attention to him than if it had been the Three Stooges."62 Likewise,
another person was found qualified who said she only reads the
newspapers for the comics and the horoscope."
Pluralists balked that the North jury as seated hardly
represented a "cross-section" of the community, only a collection of
the odd-lot persons whose major qualification to deliberate on
behalf of the community was that they were virtual drop-outs from
that community.
The level of news ignorance required for
admission to the North jury was so high that it raised substantial
questions about the quality of deliberation one could expect from
such an alienated jury. It turned out that North's jury acquitted
him on the bulk of the charges. Interviewed afterwards, several
jurors remarked that it seemed unfair to make the low man on the
totem pole pay for crimes when higher-ups were left off.' This
remark was troubling in two regards. First, a jury more informed
about the news might well have known that higher-ups, including
National Security Adviser Rear Admiral John Poindexter, had been
indicted for their alleged role in the scandal. Second, the "small
guy/big guy" defense played well before a jury whose political
apathy roughly correlated with mistrust of government. It is worth
raising the question of whether North's defense would have played
as well before a jury that equally represented engaged citizens.
E. Verdicts According to Law versus Verdicts According to Conscience
I turn finally to the question of whether deliberating jurors are
59 United States vNorth, 713 F Supp 1444, 144445 (D DC 1989).
60

Id at 1445.

Fred Kaplan, North Jurors Won Seats With Blissful Ignorance,Boston Globe 3 (Apr
22, 1989).
62 Dennis Bell, North Jury Selection Begins; Effects of Iran-contra Hearings at Issue,
Newsday 7 (Feb 1, 1989).
63 Dennis Bell, Criminalor Hero?, Newsday 5 (Feb 22, 1989).
64 David E. Rosenbaum, JurorsSee North as a Scapegoatfor His Superiors, NY Times Al
(May 6, 1989).
61
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better off debating the meaning and justice of the law itself or
merely accepting and applying the law on the books. A long and
ancient tradition, captured in the hoary phrase "verdicts according
to conscience," entitled jurors to consider whether the law a
defendant violated was worthy of enforcement. If jurors felt either
that the law was inherently unjust or was being enforced against a
particular defendant in an unjust or overreaching manner, then
jurors were historically free to "nulli the law by freeing even the
guilty defendant.'
Jury nullification gave jurors remarkable power to have the
final say about how the law should be applied in their own
communities.
History is full of shining examples, as when
Northern jurors refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law against
defendants who aided runaway slaves to escape."6 But history also
gives us its share of revolting instances when all-white Southern
grand juries simply refused to indict "[w]hen the offender was a
white man and the victim a Negro." 7 In between the heroic and
the despicable are the more routine instances of jury nullification
throughout history: Prohibition-era juries were lax in enforcing the
law against small-time, nonviolent bootleggers; juries today remain
reluctant to convict drunk drivers in cases where drunkenness is
clear but no injury occurred. 8
Officially today, in all but two states, jury nullification is a
disapproved doctrine. 9 Judges typically instruct jurors that they
must "apply ... the law which I will give to you" and that they

65

For the history of jury nullification, see Abramson, We, The Jury at 57-95 (cited in

note 1).
6
Examples are cited seriatim in Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers:Enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (North Carolina 1970).
67
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy
552 (Harper and Brothers 1944).
68
Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 291-97 (Little, Brown 1966).
In 1998, a jury in Norfolk County, Massachusetts found Boston Red Sox slugger Mo Vaughn
not guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, despite testimony from two
arresting officers that Vaughn could not recite the alphabet. To dispel the notion that
Vaughn's celebrity status got him off, the court clerk released data showing that during the

past year juries in Norfolk County had acquitted 67 out of 119 defendants charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Will McDonough, Nothing Special for Vaughn,
Boston Globe G1 (Mar 7, 1998). When measured against data showing that juries convict in
two-thirds of misdemeanors cases, the leniency of jurors toward drunk driving defendants
calls for some explanation. One factor is the difficulty of proving the case when a suspect
refuses a breathalyzer test, as Vaughn had done. The other likely explanation is unwillingness to convict when no injury results from drunk driving.
69 Maryland and Indiana are the only two states that require judges, upon motion of a
defendant, to inform the jury of its right to acquit against the law. See Abramson, We, The
Jury at 62 (cited in note 1).
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"must follow the law.., whether you agree with it or not."7 ° Such
instructions cut off or suppress jury deliberations in two related
regards. First, the jury is duty-bound to accept the judge's
instructions on the law as the definitive statement of what the law
is. Jurors are thus not free to dispute the judge and to arrive at
their own interpretation of the laws at issue. Second, the jury is
duty-bound to apply that law strictly and mechanically, with no
regard to what they think about its fairness.
The impartialist school applauds the death of jury nullification.
In addition to everything else they must bracket, jurors must
surrender their politics, their own judgments about whether duly
enacted laws are just or unjust, wise, or silly. Outside the jury
context, of course, these are the disagreements that exercise us
most, the disagreements that entice citizens to settle their
disputes through rational deliberation and
fundamental
We argue among ourselves and petition our
persuasion.
representatives about what the laws should be on abortion or
But inside the jury room,
marijuana or assisted suicide.
deliberation is constrained by the fact that the legislature has
already spoken and jurors argue only from already settled
premises. If jurors could unsettle those premises and deliberate
whether they happened to agree with the law, then there effectively
would be no law at all, only an anarchy of conscience, an
unpredictable series of ad hoc judgments by isolated groups of
All this makes jury nullification the opposite of
twelve.
impartiality; it is pure license for jurors to pick and choose in the
most subjective of fashions which laws to enforce against which
defendants.7 '
Pluralists are also wary of jury nullification, but in the end
they are more receptive than the impartialists. 7' What they like
about the doctrine - the power it gives juries to reflect community
norms and values - is what they fear about it, knowing full well
that those community norms can themselves be discriminatory or
undemocratic. Moreover, nullification gives even one solitary,
rogue juror the power to hang the whole jury, thereby undermining
70 Manual of Modern CriminalJury Instructionsfor the Ninth Circuit 1.01, 3.01 (West

1992).

71 For one of the most influential judicial condemnations ofjury nullification as inconsistent with the rule of law, see United States v Dougherty, 473 F2d 1113, 1130-37 (DC Cir
1972).
72 See, for example, Alan W. Scheffin and Jdn M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience ofJury Nullification,48 Wash & Lee L Rev 165 (1991); Darryl K Brown, JuryNullification within the Rule ofLaw, 81 Minn L Rev 1149, 1153 (1997).
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the struggle to empanel representative juries in the first place. But
for all these difficulties, pluralists question whether we can call the
jury a deliberative body at all if it is stripped entirely of
independent judgment about the justice of a law or the fairness of
enforcing it in a particular case. So stripped, jurors might still
argue and debate the facts free from judicial control. But once the
facts are found, the jury would proceed less by deliberating and
more by mechanically applying judicial instructions on the law to
the facts as found.
The question then becomes whether there is any way to tame
or hem in jury nullification so as to get the good without the bad.
Pluralists suggest that there is no inherent contradiction between
respecting the rule of law and mercifully refusing to enforce the law
in certain circumstances. When police exercise their discretion not
to arrest a person they lawfully could; when prosecutors exercise
their discretion not to indict the arrested person or to indict only for
a lesser charge than the maximum available, no one claims that
such discretion is lawless or destructive of laws uniformity.
Instead, enforcing the letter of the law too strictly undermines
public respect for the law and may well result in applying the law
to circumstances that the legislature did not foresee or intend to
cover. Jury nullification can serve similar purposes, for there is no
reason to believe that jurors as a group will exercise their discretion
to be lenient any less responsibly than police and prosecutors
exercise theirs. Wholesale rejection of jury nullification seems to
rest on the mistaken premise that every departure from uniformity
undermines the rule of law, whereas in fact one of the basic norms
of the rule of law is that each case is to be judged on its own
merits.73
Moreover, consider the discretion judges enjoy under the
exclusionary rule to suppress evidence incriminating a defendant
as a way of punishing official violations of the law. The effect of
excluding the evidence may well be that a guilty defendant
eventually goes free, but any other result, the Supreme Court has
said in endorsing the exclusionary rule, would reward official
lawlessness and undermine respect for the integrity of the trial
process. Jury nullification permits jurors to make their own
response to official lawlessness, when they essentially set the
defendant free rather than ratify the misconduct that built the case
against him. 4 Of course, sensibly exercising the nullifying power
73
74

Brown, 81 Minn L Rev 1149 (cited in note 72).
Id at 1172-8.
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will require jurors to weigh the gravity of the crime against the
severity and frequency of the misconduct. We certainly would not
encourage jurors to refuse to convict an obviously guilty murderer
simply as a way of condemning a prosecutor who suborned perjury.
But in the case of a nonviolent drug crime, jury refusals to go along
with a borderline legal sting operation may well foster rather than
undermine respect for law.
In the above sort of cases, jurors revolt not against the law
itself, but against the silliness of applying the law in certain
situations or against the rottenness of the agents enforcing it.
What about those grander instances where the jury nullifies to
declare its rejection of the law itself as unjust? Several Michigan
juries have apparently done just that, refusing to convict Dr. Jack
Kevorkian of violating state law against physician-assisted suicide
even though Kevorkian has defiantly admitted his acts. 5 The
pluralist model seeks to make room for jury nullification as jury
revolt. While it is true that we elect legislators, not jurors, to pass
laws, we continue to call on jurors to decide if even duly enacted
laws remain worthy of enforcement. Repeated refusals of different
juries to convict Dr. Kevorkian tell Michigan legislators that the
law no longer enjoys popular support, or that the will to enforce it
concretely was never there. These are important functions of the
jury system, allowing the people-at-large to help define enforceable
Michigan law.
But even pluralists would acknowledge problems with
defending jury nullification in this way. First, some Michigan
juries may enforce the assisted suicide law even as others balk.
Unless case-specific variables can explain the different verdicts,
Michigan ends up with a balkanized situation where the law on
assisted suicide is what any particular jury says it is.
The second difficulty is that jury revolts against the law may
be premised on norms and values that contradict basic public
policies or settled democratic principles. This was the case with
Emmett Till's jury in 1954, when twelve white Mississippians did
not think it worth enforcing murder laws against two white men
who killed Till, a fourteen-year-old black youth whom the men
thought acted sassy toward a white lady. 6 Jury nullification
permitted the jurors to act on such beliefs without fearing ill
75 David Margolick, Jury Acquits Dr.Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, NY Times
Al (May 3, 1994); Richard Knox, Verdict Touches off Deliberations,Boston Globe A10 (May 3,
1994).
76 Stephen Whitfield, A Death in the Delta 42 (Free Press 1988).
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consequences for themselves or for the defendants being freed. As
to the defendants, principles of double jeopardy meant they could
never be tried for the murders in Mississippi again, not even after
they admitted to the murder in Look magazine.77 The jurors, for
their part, simply went home since there was no mechanism to hold
them accountable.
The lack of any juror accountability principle is what makes
jury nullification so hard to justify on democratic terms. If we do
not like the laws enacted by the legislature, we can at least vote the
rascals out. But jurors come and go, free to acquit against the law
without fear of punishment, without even having to state in writing
the reasons for nullifying the law or that they did nullify the law.
An unexplained "not guilty" is all that the public hears. For these
reasons, even most pluralists remain skeptical that the jury is
really an appropriate forum for democratic deliberation about the
justice of duly enacted laws.
Consider a current proposal from Georgetown Law Professor
Paul Butler that black jurors in particular should drop all pretense
of being impartial and use the power of jury nullification in a race
conscious manner to acquit guilty African American defendants
charged with nonviolent drug possession offenses.7" Butler begins
by noting that narcotics enforcement falls disproportionately on
young black men, largely because the laws punish possession of
cocaine in crack form, popular in inner cities, far more severely
than possession of cocaine in powder form, popular in white
suburbs.79 Efforts to seek legislative redress have failed, argues
Butler,
because African
Americans
are
still
sorely
underrepresented in legislatures and because racism keeps normal
coalition-formation beyond black power."0 By contrast, African
Americans do have access to jury duty, and the doctrine of
nullification permits even a minority of blacks to hang juries as a
way to protest the injustice of a war on drugs that makes inner
cities the only battlefield. Butler urges black jurors to make their
own utilitarian analysis that the costs to the black community of
prosecuting nonviolent drug offenses - these prosecutions are a big
reason that one-third of all black men in their twenties are behind
bars, on parole, or on probation8 ' - far outweigh any public safety
77

Id at 54.

Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 Yale L J 677, 715-25 (1995).
78

79 Id at 718-19.
80 Id at 709-12.
81 Marc Mauer and Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice
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benefit returned to the black community.82 Since a similar costbenefit analysis militates in favor of incarcerating violent criminals,
nullification would not be justified
on Butler's terms in cases
8 3
involving violence against a victim

But Butler's case for jury nullification as a form of "black
power" falls under its own weight.84 He justifies nullification as a
last resort in a structurally racist society that perpetuates the
political impotence of the black underclass. But if things are that
bad outside juries, then they certainly would get a whole lot worse
if African Americans started an open campaign of subverting
criminal law enforcement on juries. On Butler's own description of
racism in America, the backlash would be palpable. Within the
world of the jury, white power likely would respond by abolishing
the unanimous verdict (as a way of preventing two or three
nullification-bent jurors from hanging the whole),85 and by
redoubling efforts to challenge the impartiality of blacks to serve on
juries.

86

To his credit, Butler candidly admits that he wants African
American jurors to practice politics on juries as avowed partisans of
the interests of their race.87 He pushes the representative
paradigm to an extreme, encouraging juror representatives to use
nullification the way legislators use filibusters to hang the process.
But there is precious little reason to believe that the minority race
System: Five Years Later 3 (Sentencing Project 1995).

Butler, 105 Yale L J at 715-18 (cited in note 78).
Id at 714-19.
84 For a cogent criticism of Butler that sees his argument as internally contradictory, see
Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:A Response to Professor
Butler, 44 UCLA L Rev 109 (1996).
85 The California District Attorneys Association urged the state legislature to abolish the
unanimous verdict, in the wake of a predominantly black jury's acquittal of O.J. Simpson of
murder charges, an acquittal that many commentators saw as jury nullification. See NonUnanimous Jury Verdicts: A Necessary Criminal Justice Reform 1-29 (California District
Attorneys Association, May 8, 1995). For arguments about whether or not the Simpson jury
nullified, see Jeffrey Abramson, ed, Postmortem: The O.J. Simpson Case: Justice Confronts
Race, Domestic Violence, Lawyers, Money, and the Media 33-71 (Basic 1996).
86 Although African American jurors can be challenged individually for cause, it is not
constitutional to use race as a basis for exercising a peremptory challenge against any juror.
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). Nevertheless, many commentators believe that prosecutors continue to use peremptories to strike blacks from juries, avoiding the Batson ban
simply by inventing after the fact a race-neutral rationalization for their challenges. See, for
example, Charles Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am Crim L Rev 1099, 1107-13 (1994). To the extent that
prosecutors already end run Batson to strike African American jurors, Butler's insistence that
blacks do and ought to behave as partisans of certain black defendants can only confirm the
suspicions that make prosecutors eager to avoid Batson.
87 Butler, 105 Yale L J at 715 (cited in note 78).
82
83
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would benefit from open politicization ofjury behavior. Butler says
jury nullification is not justified for whites, given their access to
other power channels. This may be true but it is naive to think
that whites would not get caught up in a reverse nullification
passion, following the lead of right-wing militia members who
already see nullification as a way to prevent enforcement of federal
gun laws against militia members."8 American jury history is sadly
marred by a tradition of all-white juries refusing to deliberate in
cases where both victim and defendant were black ("so who cares?")
or where the victim was black but the defendant white ("so why
bother?"). 89 We should not easily suggest to jurors of any race, then,
that they need not deliberate but may simply go in and practice
racial politics. If jurors become representatives in this starkly
partisan way, jury room behavior will rarely work to benefit
minorities.
II. TWO CHEERS AND ONE NO FOR REPRESENTATIVE JURIES

The past generation has witnessed a paradigm shift in how we
regard the jury. Instead of viewing the jury narrowly as a judicial
institution designed merely to serve the interests of litigants, we
now acknowledge the jury's broader political and democratic
functions. 0 These include the equal rights of citizens to serve on
juries;9' victims' interests in having their peers - not just those of
the defendants - decide the case; 2 and the community's interest in
local 3autonomy when it comes to judging crimes committed on its
9

soil.

The old paradigm made impartiality the key to jury selection
and saw impartiality in frankly elitist terms that limited jury duty
to persons of superior intelligence, education, and character.94 As
SId at 680 n 11.
89 Id (quoting Wade Lambert, More Angry Men: MilitiasAre Joining Jury-PowerAc-

tivists to Fight Government, Wall St J Al (May 25, 1995)).
90 Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1094-95 (cited in note 21).
91 Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79,87 (1986).
92 State v Lozano, 616 S2d 73, 75-76 (Fla App 1993). Officer Lozano, a Miami police
officer of Hispanic descent, shot and killed a black motorcyclist in a predominantly black
neighborhood of Miami. His original conviction was thrown out and a change of venue ordered. But in searching for an appropriate venue, the Florida courts took into consideration
not only the defendants interest in having Hispanics represented on his jury but also the
survivors of the victim's interest in having African Americans represented as well.
93 'The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. [Unrepresentative] selection
procedures... undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system ofjustice." Batson,
476 US at 87.
94 See discussion in text accompanying note 9.
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long as these subjective criteria were applied in nondiscriminatory
fashion, the mere fact that juries did not "look like America" raised
no concerns about the jury's democratic credentials. Indeed, by
screening jurors one by one, making all eligible without regard to
race, religion, or gender, and yet accepting only those who had the
virtue it takes to transcend their own identity politics during
deliberations, we supposedly chose jurors best able to deliberate
according to democratic norms of equal respect for all.
The paradigm began to shift in 1968 when Congress abolished
the elite jury in favor of a practice that drew jurors from a
representative cross-section of the population.95 The shift was
justified first on evidence that the supposedly neutral elite criteria
were being applied in invidiously discriminatory ways that
purposely excluded blacks and women in particular. But Congress
was clear that elite jury selection would be wrong even if perfectly
nondiscriminatory. The new paradigm insisted that only a
"representative" jury could be an "impartial" jury, impartial now
redefined as a matter of "balancing," not "bracketing" the inevitable
biases jurors bring to their deliberations.96
For the first time in history, the paradigm shift made juries
into mass democratic institutions, redesigned to mirror in their
membership the range and balance of the American people. But it
has not proved easy to convert the jury into the mass democratic
model, to reconcile the inevitable tensions between impartiality and
representation and between litigants' interest in having the final
say about who is or is not biased and the community's interest in
preventing the adversary process from slanting or manipulating
the selection process.
The unresolved question today is how far to push the new ideal
Pushing too little undermines the
of representative juries.
legitimacy of jury verdicts in those communities left
underrepresented - there is at least an appearance problem, say,
in interracial cases where the jury remains all-white or all-black for
whatever reason. But beyond appearances, pushing too little for
representative juries may weaken the information base upon which
good deliberation depends, leaving jurors from one section of town
uninformed about facts of life on the other side of the tracks.
Simply not to care about the mix of jurors, as long as each one
individually is impartial, is a sign either of naivete about American
life or else of the elitist belief that some particularly virtuous
95 Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 USC §§ 1861-69.
96 Abramson, We, The Jury at 117-18 (cited in note 1).
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persons are capable of escaping their own identities and of
impersonating the rest of us during deliberation.
On the other hand, pushing the representative model too far
leads to the familiar populist fallacy that flatters the many,
dismisses deliberation as mythic, and fools us into thinking that
jury duty is easy work because all any of us can do in the end is
vote our own demographics. On the belief that demography trumps
deliberation, the strict pluralist makes numerical balance on the
jury an inflexible end in itself, until we arrive at a rigidity of
thought that considers only who the jurors are, not what they do.
Let me offer one example of the elitist fallacy of too little
concern for diverse juries, and one illustration of the populist
fallacy of too much concern for diversity.
A. Voter Lists and the Betrayal of Diversity
Federal law says that the initial jury list must approximate a
"fair cross section of the community." 7 In pursuit of this goal, the
law specifies that the voter list or voter registration list is the
starting source of names but authorizes consulting other sources
when necessary to compensate for a group's substantial underrepresentation on the voter rolls. 8 State laws follow this federal
model.
Assume that the choice of the voter rolls as the basic source of
juror names was not motivated by a desire to under-represent
minorities. Still, that is the effect. Even after legal obstacles to
voting have largely been removed, certain groups - the poor in
general, African Americans and Hispanics in particular - do not
register or vote in proportion to their share of the population.99
Today, a majority of states respond to the under-inclusiveness of
the voter rolls by supplementing that list with names taken from
lists of licensed drivers, census data, telephone directories, utility
bills, and the like.'
In order to know when and how to
97

28 USC § 1861.

98 28 USC § 1863(bX2) ("The plan shall prescribe some other source or sources of names

in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy [of recruiting jurors from a community cross-section]."). During debate in the House on this section, it was said in committee
that "[t]he voting list need not perfectly mirror the percentage structure of the community, but
any substantial percentage deviations must be corrected by the use of supplemental sources.
The committee would leave the definition of 'substantial' to judicial decision." Remarks of Rep
Celler, 114 Cong Rec H3990 (Feb 26, 1968).
99 1992 Presidential election data show that blacks and Hispanics do not vote in proportion to their share of the population. US Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the
United States: 1993 283 tbl 454 (US Government Printing Office 1993).
100 David B. Rottman, Carol R. Flango and R. Shedine Lockley, State Court Organization,
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supplement, state jury commissioners frequently keep track of the
racial and gender percentages in the jury pool. 10 '
Federal courts, on the other hand, are remarkably united in
refusing to supplement the voter rolls as a source of jury names. In
challenge after challenge, judges find any departures from crosssectionality attributable to use of the voter lists to be acceptably
small.10 2 Commentators who support the federal position add that
any loss in achieving the goal of proportional representation for the
poor and minorities is offset by the gain in the quality of jury
deliberation when we use the voter rolls as an indirect way to
screen for civic virtue.
I am inclined to agree with the state position, for at least five
reasons. First, use of the voter lists as the sole source of juror
names results in far larger levels of underrepresentation than the
federal courts seem willing to acknowledge. In the federal judicial
district in Connecticut, a jury selection plan survived challenge
despite uncontested evidence that Hispanics constituted only 11.0
percent of eligible jurors in a district where they made up 15.7
percent of the adult population." 3 This is a nation-wide problem,
given that only 28.9 percent of eligible Hispanic voters actually
voted in the 1992 Presidential election, as compared with 63.6
percent of eligible whites." 4
Second, when Congress legislated the requirement of selecting
jurors from a community cross-section, it specifically authorized
federal courts to supplement the voter rolls in order to achieve the
goal. 05 Persistent failure to use their statutory powers to fulfill
legal obligations raises serious questions about whether federal
courts even want to achieve the goal of cross-sectional jury lists.
Third, the law on the books specifically requires federal courts
1993 256-64 thl 34 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995).
101 An example is DeKalb County, Georgia where the voting age population is divided into
thirty-six separate categories, defined by overlapping criteria of age, sex, and race. A computer then selects names to put on the jury list so that each of these thirty-six groups will be
represented according to their percentage of the population. Andrew Kull, Racial Justice:
Trial by Cross-Section, New Republic 17, 18 (Nov 30, 1992).
For a summary of federal court reluctance to supplement the voter lists as a source of
1I2
juror names, see Hon. Walter P. Gewin, An Analysis ofJury Selection Decisions,appended to
Fosterv Sparks, 506 F2d 805, 816-17 (5th Cir 1975) ("We are aware of no case in which exclusive reliance on voter registration lists has been invalidated"). See also UnitedStates v Cecil,
836 F2d 1431, 1447-48 (4th Cir 1988) (conclusion of Judge Gewin supported by all reported
decisions since).
103 United States v Biaggi, 909 F2d 662, 677 (2d Cir 1990). For similar cases, see Abramson, We, The Jury at 129-31 (cited in note 1).
104 US Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract ofthe United States at 283 tbl 454 (cited
in note 99).
105 28 USC § 1863(bX2).
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to do more than merely not discriminate when compiling a list of
persons eligible for jury duty; Congress mandated an affirmative or
positive requirement that the master jury wheel actually be
representative of the community.' °s So the defense that no one
intends to discriminate against the poor and minorities by using
the voter rolls is beside the point.
Fourth, the notion that some serious screening for "civic virtue"
occurs when we limit jury duty to voters is almost laughable.
Granted, it takes some effort to register and to vote. But the effort
is so minimal as not to prove much at all, especially since the
motivations it takes to get people to the voting booth may or may
not be good motivations for would-be jurors to have. In any event,
the transience of the poor makes it that much more difficult to keep
one's registration current or to be physically present come Election
Day to vote in the county where one is a registered voter. This
makes it likely that we are screening in many instances for lack of
permanent address rather than absence of interest. The bottom
line, however, is that the "civic virtue" advocates make the classical
elitist mistake of assuming nonvoters are somehow dumber than
the rest of us, or at least more apathetic in ways that would make
them sleepy jurors. There is simply no empirical evidence to
condemn nonvoters so universally.
Fifth, the problem is not so much that nonvoters are being
underrepresented as it is that nonvoters who happen to be poor and
minorities are being underrepresented. This means that, from the
very start of jury selection, we lose any realistic hope of getting
exactly the kind of racial and economic diversity on actual juries
that matters most to making deliberation democratic. The point is
not that the nonvoting poor have some particular set of interests
that must be politically represented on juries. The point is that
they too have a role to play in turning the attention of a jury to
facts, information and ways of viewing the evidence, that might
otherwise be missed.
For all the endorsement in words of starting jury selection with
a list that makes all citizens equally eligible for jury duty, federal
courts make a fetish of using the voter lists as a source of juror
names, long after it has become obvious that exclusive reliance on
that list can undermine chances that the poor and minorities will
be fairly represented on actual juries. This should change or else
we should stop paying even lip service to the representative ideal
for juries.
16 28 USC § 1861.
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B. The Push for Quotas
I turn finally to quotas on the jury as an example of pushing
the representative model too far. I reach this conclusion hesitantly
because I am aware that the logic of much of what I have endorsed
in this paper points toward a need for quotas. After all,
deliberation takes place only in the jury room, not on the master
list. So if it is the case that diversity enriches deliberation, if
diversity is crucial to silencing prejudice and to educating jurors to
look at the evidence from other points of view, then don't we need to
secure at least some minimal level of representation for at least
some groups on the actual jury?"'
One could add another argument in favor of jury quotas. The
usual political outrage triggered when schools or factories use
quotas to the disadvantage of whites is unlikely to develop against
jury quotas; the average white person is just not that keen to get on
the jury in the first place.
Despite persuasive arguments in favor of jury quotas, at least
for minority races, I conclude that they would do more harm than
good. Now is a time when faith in the jury system is already
precarious, rocked by the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson images of
first white jurors, then black jurors simply voting their race.
Imposing quotas on jury selection could very well reinforce the
growing perception that there is no shared justice for juries to
represent in racially charged cases, that the best we can do is to
represent the races and let them bargain through their
disagreements.
I am not sure that a quota system would deliver that message.
Perhaps citizens of good will would view them only as a necessary
device for bringing the races together in reasoned conversation.
But even then, the potential for divisiveness would be great. And
the gain to deliberation would be speculative, when we get down to
small numbers and rather offensively assume that putting any
three African Americans on a jury assures that the same "black
views" on the evidence will be aired.' 8
Imagine, then, fighting the following "quota wars" as groups in
107 For arguments in favor of quotas, see Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the
Jury, 44 Duke L J 704 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
Mich L Rev 1611, 1695-1700 (1985); Note, The Case for Black Juries,79 Yale L J 531, 546-50
(1970).
108 For an argument that members of the black middle class share certain moral views
with the white middle class more than with poor blacks, see Alan Wolfe, One Nation,After All
(Viking 1998).
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America contend to have one or more of the twelve (sometimes only
six) jury seats reserved for them.
1) Which groups should be represented on which juries? Only
African Americans? Even despite historical discrimination in jury
selection against Native Americans, Asian Americans, Mexican
Americans and so on? If all racial minorities are eligible, then do
we play musical chairs, rotating who sits in the reserved seats
depending on the complexion of the defendant, the victim, or both?
What about whites - are they all fungible with each other or
should a quota system give some recognition to white ethnic or
national origin differences? What about insisting that each jury
have some gender balance, some representation for the young and
the old, the rich and the poor?
These examples only begin listing the groups that would
inevitably vie for quota space. If we are going to play musical
chairs on the jury, then why not have a gay seat in cases where a
gay teacher sues for employment discrimination? What about if the
person claiming employment discrimination is a handicapped
American suing under the Americans for Disability Act? Or again,
what if the handicapped person is Hispanic, do we now have to
recruit for an Hispanic American who is also handicapped? What if
an elderly Hispanic handicapped female person sues for both age,
sex, and handicap discrimination? Not only would this be an
impossible system to run in practice; it suggests a remarkable level
of balkanization, as if we should fashion designer juries fitted to
each case. At some point, the justifications for quotas negate any
possible reason to believe in juries and in the ideal of deliberation
at all.
2) Even if we scale the quota system back to require only
racial quotas, there would still be reasons to balk. Racial quotas
insult all races equally by saying we are all not only influenced by
race but ultimately allegiant to our own kind. Quotas treat each
white like every other white, every African American as having
basically the same views as any other African American. This must
be the assumption, or else we do not get what we bargain for simply
by putting a particular person on the jury simply because we need
someone of his or her race in the seat.
Empirically speaking, when we are talking not about a
statistical sample but about one or two or three individuals, race is
not an accurate predictor of juror behavior.0 9 I do not wish to claim
109 For citations to scholarly studies of the impact of race on jurors, see sources cited in

Abramson, We, The Jury at 273 n 19 (cited in note 1). For citations to studies casting doubt on
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that a juror's race is totally uninformative about likely views. But
the connection in any one person between race and case-relevant
attitudes is simply too loose to justify a quota system, given all the
practical problems imposing quotas create.
CONCLUSION

Where does all this leave us? Short of quotas, there are steps
we should take to maximize the chances of achieving representative
juries. Supplementing the voter list with other sources of names is
a good place to start. Next, I suggest we pay jurors a living wage so
that self-employed and low-income citizens do not have to be
excused for financial hardship. This could be done by requiring
employers to pay the wages of employees on jury duty. It might
make sense to exempt small businesses from this obligation and to
cap any employer's obligation at ten days allowance for jury duty
per year. These details can be worked out but the principle of
getting larger employers to defray the costs of jury duty is an
important one. For self-employed persons or employees not covered
by an employer plan, I suggest paying them the prevailing
minimum hourly wage. That certainly would speed trials up!
We should also abolish statutory provisions that exempt
certain professions from jury duty on the dubious theory that
doctors, lawyers and teachers always have something more
important to do than serve on juries. And I suggest that we not be
so afraid of pretrial publicity. Better to try to keep newspaper
readers in the jury pool, disqualifying only those who on individual
examination truly seem unable to understand the difference
between being tried in print and being tried in court.
Perhaps the most pressing need is to enforce the law
prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges. If a prosecutor can
explain away his strikes of two African American men in the jury
venire by saying he was really responding to their unkempt hair
and beards, then when there is a will to strike African American
jurors from a particular jury, there always will be a way."' In
permitting these "hair-based" strikes to stand, the Supreme Court
noted that the prosecutor's inference of bias from hair length was
ridiculous and yet constitutional because not racially motivated."'
If racial diversity on juries has to make way even for wholly
the predictability of any one juror's behavior from demographic factors, see sources cited in id
at 281 n 10.
110 Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 766(1995).
11 Id at 768.
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arbitrary uses of peremptory challenges, then we as a society are
just not willing to seek representative juries in any robust way.
Without abolishing peremptory challenges, we could at least put
some bite in Batson by requiring prosecutors to have some
rationally articulable basis for asking otherwise qualified minority
members of the jury venire to step down. Giving permission to an
officer of the court to wield peremptory challenges on sheer whim
should not outweigh the public interest in keeping African
Americans, no matter what their hair style, on the jury.
All of the above steps are within our reach. They ask only that
we cast a wider and finer representative net. We cast the net
widely as jury selection commences because every citizen is equally
qualified for jury duty and everyone is equally valuable if juries are
to speak for the whole community. We make that net out of fine
mesh to prevent people from swimming free from jury duty, and to
prevent predators wielding peremptory darts to get in.
Of course, some will ask why we need to do this much. Why in
the end should we be this concerned about representation on juries?
I suppose in Utopia, it will not take diverse peoples on juries to
mull the evidence over from all relevant perspectives. Each of us
will be impartial and know the whole truth and nothing but the
truth by ourselves. I suppose the attainment of this perfect
impartiality is why Utopia will not need juries at all, why there will
not even be disputes to resolve. In the meantime, we still do have
disputes and we rely on jurors who themselves dispute to resolve
the dispute justly. Ever since God left the courtroom in 1215,
taking with him divine answers rendered in trial by ordeal, we rely
on jurors to tell us what human beings can know about justice.
From the beginning of this great replacement of God by humans in
rendering justice, it has always been thought that no one human
being can imitate God's truth, that humans see justice more clearly
when they collect their senses, their memories, and their
perspectives on events.
Collecting people together into a
conversation fed by difference but fueled by a search for common
ground is never easy. But that is the ideal of the jury system and it
remains there, within our grasp.

